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INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of the "Republican Revolution" is a shift of policymaking
authority from the national government to the states. Various federal legislative
initiatives would give states greater flexibility and autonomy in deciding how
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to fight crime,' deliver health care to the poor,2 and reform welfare. 3 One
remarkable exception to this pattern of preferring state level policymaking is
the area of tort reform. In 1996, both the United States House of Representa-
tives and Senate passed legislation that, if enacted, would preempt state tort
law in significant ways.4 Why would a Congress otherwise apparently
committed to vesting states with greater policymaking autonomy call for federal
control of tort law? These developments invite a reconsideration of federalism
values and tort policymaking.
Tort policymaking traditionally has taken place at the state level. One
assumption underlying this distribution of power is that states are better able
than the national government to fashion tort rules appropriate for local
conditions and circumstances. 5 In other words, states are thought to possess
a special competence in crafting tort rules responsive to local needs. Some
advocates of tort reform at the federal level maintain, however, that states are
incapable or unlikely to develop tort rules-especially in the realm of products
liability-consistent with national economic policy. These proponents of federal
level tort reform see the states as competing for tort judgments. Federal tort
reform is needed, so the argument goes, to counter pressures that exist at the
1. See, e.g., The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
2. See, e.g., The Medicare Preservation Act of 1995, H.R. 2425, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
3. See, e.g., The Work-First Welfare Reform Act of.1995, H.R. 315, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
4. The Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996) (approved by the Joint Conference Committee on March 14, 1996). The House of Representa-
tives and Senate had previously passed different versions of this legislation. The Common Sense Product
Liability Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (approved by the House on
March 10, 1995); The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(approved by the Senate on May 10, 1995).
There were substantial difference between the bills as originally passed by the House and Senate.
Generally speaking, the original House bill included more far reaching tort reform than its Senate
counterpart. For a concise summary of the bills as originally passed by the House and Senate, see
Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, H.R. 956, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) No. 833, at 7 (Mar. 22,
1995).
The differences between the House and Senate bills were reconciled in the conference committee.
The bill as approved by the conference committee limits the application of strict liability against
retailers, imposes limitations on punitive damages, abolishes joint and several liability for noneconomic
damages, creates defenses based on user intoxication, misuse and alteration of the product, and
establishes federal statutes of limitation and repose for products liability claims. For a concise summary
of the bill as approved by the conference committee, see Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform
Act of 1996, H.R. 956, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) No. 854, at 5-6 (March 19, 1996). For background
on this Federal legislation see H.R. REP. No. 481, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-34 (1996). For background
on the original House and Senate bills see the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995: Hearings
on H.R.10 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. Ist Sess. (1995); H.R. Rep. No.
62 and 64, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
At the time of this writing, President Clinton is threatening to veto the bill. Martha M. Hamilton,
Liability Bill to Get Clinton Veto; President Calls Measure Limiting Damages Unfair, WASH. POST,
Mar. 17, 1996, at Al.
5. See, e.g., Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 503, 507 (1987).
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state level to use tort law as a vehicle for redistributing wealth from nonresi-
dent defendants to resident plaintiffs.6 Under this view, states are largely
incompetent to make sensible rules about products liability.
Our paper examines these two,7 contradictory assumptions about state
competence in the realm of tort policymaking. First, we explore the proposition
that states are incompetent to formulate sensible tort law policy, especially in
the area of products liability. If the assumption of state incompetency were
true, we would expect to find state legislation and judicial opinions that
systematically favor resident plaintiffs. Second, we employ social scientific
research methodology to question whether states have special competence to
formulate tort policy. Specifically, we focus on damage caps, one of the most
controversial components of tort reform, and analyze differences in state
legislation taking into account demographic, political and legal attributes of the
state. If state policymaking is indeed responsive to local conditions, we would
expect some association between insurance profitability and damage-cap
legislation.
In the end, however, we find flaws with both sets of assumptions. We find
little evidence of state incompetency fueled by a competition for damage
awards against nonresident defendants. An examination of state legislation and
judicial decisions does not reveal a systematic bias against the interests of
nonresident defendants. On the contrary, states have engaged in a high degree
of pro-defendant policymaking. At the same time, however, we find little to
support the assumption that states are highly competent in the area of tort
policymaking. There appears to be little correlation between local conditions
(measured by insurance profitability) and policy output (reflected in damage-
cap legislation). Instead, enactment of damage-cap legislation is more closely
associated with other traditional indicators of political power. Our tentative
conclusion is that, in the area of tort reform, federalism is less a principle for
allocating power between national and state governments than it is rhetoric to
support substantive policy preferences.
6. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
7. We recognize that there are other arguments made in support of and in opposition to federal tort
policymaking. Professor Gary Schwartz maintains that federal legislation in the area of products liability
is justified because of the need for uniform liability rules relating to nationally distributed products. Gary
T. Schwartz, The Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIz. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
For earlier discussions of this topic, see, for example, Perlnan, supra note 5; 0. Lee Reed & John H.
Watkins, Product Liability Tort Refonn: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1984):
David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1985). We
confine our discussion to these two assumptions. Our contribution to the federalism debate is bringing
an empirical focus to the underlying assumptions made by various advocates. We recognize the
limitations of our paper. It is only a beginning and not the final word on the subject.
Constructing a New Federalism
I. ARE STATES INCOMPETENT ToRT POLICYMAKERS?
A. The Assumption: A "Race to the Bottom"
One justification for federal level policymaking is that states are structurally
incompetent to develop policies that advance national goals. State sovereignty
is one barrier to policymaking consistent with national goals. As independent
sovereigns, each state retains a sphere of autonomy that another state cannot
override. Illinois, for example, cannot dictate Wisconsin's water pollution
control policies.8 Additionally, competitive forces might induce states to adopt
policies that actually run contrary to national objectives. Independent states
may compete with each other for some scare resource, such as business
development. For example, one state may choose to relax its pollution control
laws in an effort to attract new industry. A neighboring state, also interested
in attracting new industry, might respond by relaxing its pollution control
standards even further. This competition for industry would in theory produce
a "race to the bottom" 9 externalizing pollution costs on neighboring states and
impeding achievement of national environmental policy. Some argue that
uniform federal environmental regulations are needed to prevent this. race to the
bottom among states competing for industrial development.10
The race to the bottom rationale has emerged as a justification for federal
level tort reform, particularly with regard to products liability. In a provocative
book, Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court asserted that
state judges and legislators have incentives to shape and apply tort law to
systematically favor the interests of resident plaintiffs over those of nonresident
product manufacturers." In this context, the competition among states is said
8. Cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that no state may call upon federal
courts to apply federal common law to establish water pollution standards to discharges from other
states).
9. The concept of a "race to the bottom" appears to have been coined by Professor Cary to explain
why states, particularly Delaware, created a favorable legal climate for management in order to attract
business incorporations. William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663,668-69 (1974). For a thoughtful reexamination of this thesis, see Daniel R. Fischel, The
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections of Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law,
76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977). Recent
commentary on the relevance of the race to the bottom thesis to environmental law includes Kirsten
Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in Equity, Efficiency,
Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1522-23 (1995); Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom"RationaleforFederal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1993).
11. RicHARD NEELY, THE PRODUcT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM
THE POLMCS OF STATE COURTS (1988).
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to be for tort judgments against nonresident defendants. 2 Tort law is viewed
as a mechanism for redistributing wealth from nonresident manufacturers to
resident plaintiffs. According to Justice Neely, states competing for tort
judgments will be indifferent to national economic policy. "As far as any
elected legislator is concerned, then, generating more conservative product
liability rules is the no-win political exercise of redistributing wealth from local
residents to out-of-state business. "13 Neely also claims that judges are
influenced by this competition:
The fact of the matter is that as a state judge, I can do nothing to make
the overall law more sensitive to concerns of national economic policy.
The best I can do, and I do it all the time, is to make sure that my own
state's residents get more money out of Michigan than Michigan
residents get out of us. This I call the competitive race to the bottom
and it is at the heart of the structural problems presented by uncoordi-
nated local jurisdictions.14
A few years after the publication of his book, Justice Neely provided a
concrete example of the race to the bottom in action. In Blankenship v. General
Motors Corp.,"5 the West Virginia Supreme Court considered whether to
recognize a tort claim for "enhanced injuries" under the "crashworthiness"
doctrine. General Motors argued that such an action would be "unfair,"
particularly since West Virginia did not allow the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt to be considered as contributory negligence. 6 General Motors also
claimed that recognizing this type of claim would encourage juries to "second-
guess the safety standards promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration... leaving manufacturers ... unable to predict what juries
will deem a 'defective product'... [and] giving the whole regulatory effort a
12. At first blush, it may appear counterintuitive that states would compete for business, see supra
note 9, and at the same time compete for tort judgments against business. This apparent conflict
evaporates when one considers who benefits from the respective competitions. The economic benefits
of businesses locating plants or other facilities in a given state are captured by that state. Thus, there
are incentives for states to compete for new automobile assembly plants and the like. Adopting pro-
defendant tort rules, however, will do little to protect those businesses. The vast majority of products
manufactured in a given state are used or consumed outside that state. The tort rules generated by the
state in which the product is manufactured generally will not govern claims arising from the use of that
product outside the jurisdiction. The vast majority of plaintiffs, on the other hand, are residents of the
forum state. While the adoption of pro-defendant tort rules will provided only limited benefit to resident
defendants, pro-plaintiff tort rules will enable resident plaintiffs to secure compensation from mostly
nonresident defendants. For further discussion of this point, see S. Rep. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, A Choice of Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, in NEW
DIREC17ONS IN LAB=IUTY LAW 90, 92-93 (W. Olson ed., 1988).
13. NEELY, supra note 11, at 71.
14. Id. at 71-72.
15. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
16. Id. at 783-84.
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certain Alice in Wnderland quality."17 Despite characterizing these arguments
as "strong","8 the Court held for the plaintiff. In a revealing passage, Justice
Neely wrote:
Although some members of this Court have reservations about the
wisdom of many aspects of tort law, as a court we are utterly powerless
to make the overall tort system for cases arising in interstate commerce
more rational: Nothing that we do will have any impact whatsoever on
the set of economic trade-offs that occur in the national economy. And,
ironically, trying unilaterally to make the American tort system more
rational through being uniquely responsible in West Virginia will only
punish our residents severely without, in any regard, improving the
system for anyone else.19
The court then considered which party should bear the burden of proof with
regard to the enhanced injury. General Motors urged the court to adopt a rule
that would make the plaintiff prove what injuries would have resulted from the
collision in the absence of the design defect.' Again, the court agreed that
such a rule "makes a great deal of sense and, perhaps, it should be the national
standard in all crashworthiness cases."21 Nonetheless, the court placed the
burden of proof on the defendant because "West Virginians are not going to
pay product liability insurance premiums so that ... residents of ... [other
states] can collect the benefits."'
The race to the bottom thesis has become part of the academic and political
discourse surrounding tort reform. Some scholars embraceP or implicitly
accept the proposition that states have built-in incentives to develop and
17. Id. at 783.
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis in the original and footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at 785.
21. Id. at 786.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 12, at 92 ("In effect, consumers in states with less generous
products-liability laws pay a portion of the more generous recoveries won by plaintiffs in other states.
This imbalance introduces an incentive for strategic behavior .... Each state can profit at the expense
of the others by expanding its scope of liability, at least until the others catch up."); Michael E.
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49, 71 (1989)
("[A]ny one state has little incentive to change pro-resident tendencies in its tort law. This tendency is
exacerbated by the pro-plaintiff bias of modem choice of law theories, and by forum-shopping
opportunities exercised by plaintiffs.").
24. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAw INSrITuTE, 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL IN.URY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 261 (1991) (commenting that
punitive damage reform by a single state is likely to be ineffective because "the state that acts alone may
simply provide some relief to out-of-state manufacturers at the expense of its own citizen-vic-
tims ...."); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 3, 64 (1989) ("[W]e should
worry about whether the tort victims' ability to choose to sue in plaintiff-favoring states allows these
states to rule the nation under the guise of promoting justice, and results in a different-but no less per-
Symposium Issue:371, 1996
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apply legal doctrine that expands product manufacturer liability. Justice Neely
and others have invoked this rationale in Congressional hearings to explain
their support for federal products liability legislation.' Their testimony
appears to have been persuasive. Quoting directly from Justice Neely's book,
the House report on the pending federal tort reform bill states that this
legislation is needed because of the "bias [state policymakers have] in favor of
the in-state purchaser and against the out-of-state manufacturer."16
Thus, it appears that the race to the bottom thesis has played a significant
role in justifying tort policymaking at the federal level. Proponents of this
rationale argue that state judges and legislators cannot be trusted to develop
balanced products liability doctrines because of their bias against product
manufacturers. But how strong is the evidence of state incompetency? It is to
this question that we now turn.
B. The Evidence
If state legislators and judges were engaged in a race to the bottom, we
would expect statutes and court decisions to reflect a systematic bias against
nonresident defendants, particularly product manufacturers. However, this does
not appear to be the case. Instead, both statutory and judicial trends appear to
favor defense interests. We will first describe legislative patterns and then
judicial opinions.
1. Legislation
In the mid-1980s, the country experienced what was commonly referred to
as a "tort crisis."27 This crisis was marked by sharp increases in the cost and
decreases in the availability of liability insurance. The conventional explanation
for this development focused on increases in the frequency and severity of
verse-race to the bottom."); Ora F. Harris, Jr., 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (1989) (reviewing
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILrrY MESS: HOW BUSINES CAN BE RESCUED FROM STATE
COURT POLITICS (1988)) (characterizing the "race to the bottom" thesis as "plausible"); Matthew Harris,
Book Note, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1577, 1578 (1990) (reviewing RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT
LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM STATE COURT POLITICS (1988)) (describing,
but not questioning, the race to the bottom thesis).
25. Products Liability Fairness Act: Hearings on S. 640 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-39 (1993)
(statement of Hon. Richard Neely); Product Liability and Legal Reform, Hearings on H.R. 10 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1995) (statement by Richard K.
Willard); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ Er AL., MULTIPLE IMPOSITIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE CASE
FOR REFORM (1995) reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 139, 141-42 (1995).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 64, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1995); see also, S. REP. NO. 69, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1995) (explaining why only federal products liability reform will be effective).
27. For an overview of the 1980s crisis, see generally Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the
Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HoUS. L. REV. 207 (1990).
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claims.' That is, insurance premiums rose and coverage shrank because of
the growth in the number of tort claims being filed and in the size of damage
awards. Additional pressure to raise premiums and reduce coverage stemmed
from uncertainty about the legal standards governing the allocation of loss.
In the ensuing years, the legislatures of all fifty states responded to this
crisis with a variety of tort reform packages. While the contours of these
statutes vary from state to state, each was designed either to make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in tort suits or to reduce or limit the amount
of recovery in those suits in which the plaintiff did prevail. A thorough
examination of the hundreds of tort reform statutes lies beyond the scope of
this article.29 Here we briefly summarize state legislation in selected areas
covered by the pending federal tort reform bill.3"
a. Time-based Restrictions on Filing Claims The Common Sense Product
Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996 contains both statutes of limitations and of
repose.31 Both of these areas have been addressed extensively by state
legislatures.
In the late 1980s, many states enacted statutes directly or indirectly
reducing statutes of limitations. The most direct method simply reduces the
number of years in which to file suit.3" Other state statutes modify or abrogate
the discovery rules, allowing the limitation period to begin running from the
date of injury or the date of the defendant's culpable conduct.33 Many states
28. Other explanations of why insurance costs rose dramatically and the supply of coverage
dropped include possible collusion by insurance carriers and the regular operation of the underwriting
cycle. For differing views about the relative responsibility of these different factors for the crisis of the
mid-1980s, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense ofthe Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIo
ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation forRecent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1991); George L. Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Ralph A. Winter, The
Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
29. We have compiled a summary of tort reform legislation passed in all 50 states between 1985
and 1993 in a separately published monograph. See THOMASA. EATON & SUSETTETALARICO, TOWARD
INFORMED POLICYMAKING: TORT REFORM, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND DATA COLLECTION-A PROPOSAL
FOR GEORGIA (1993).
30. Some of the legislation discussed here has been repealed or invalidated by state courts on state
constitutional grounds. For purposes of assessing whether state legislators are engaged in a race to the
bottom, however, the important point is that these statutes were enacted in the first place.
31. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 106 (1996) (establishing a two year statute of limitations
which begins to run when the claimant should have reasonably discovered both the harm and the cause
and establishing a 15 year statute of repose for durable goods).
32. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102 (West 1989) (reducing the limitations period
for general tort claims from six years to two years).
33. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-103 (Michie 1987) (products liability); MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. §600.5838a (West 1987) (medical malpractice accrual is at the time of act, regardless of
when plaintiff discovers the claim); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (limitation period begins
running one year after injury). Some states kept the discovery rule but reduced the time period within
which a plaintiff may file a claim after discovering an injury. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2828
(1993) (must file medical malpractice claim within one year after discovery of injury); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-223 (1989) (claim for design or construction defect must be filed within two years after discovery
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also enacted provisions modifying or eliminating the special tolling provisions
for children.'
A second type of time-restriction is a statute of repose. Statutes of repose
bar claims after a specified period of time regardless of when or whether an
injury has occurred. Every state has enacted repose legislation for medical
malpractice, products liability, or claims related to improvements to real
property.35 The repose period itself varies significantly among the states.
Typically, the period of repose begins to run upon the date of last treatment,36
the date of the original sale of the product,3" or the date of substantial
completion of the improvement to real property.3 8
b. Joint and Several Liability The Product Liability Legal Reform Act
contains provisions that would modify the common law doctrine of joint and
several liability. Specifically, the Act would abolish joint and several liability
for noneconomic compensatory damages in products liability actions.39
The rule of joint and several liability has been the subject of tort reform
legislation in more than thirty states.' The thrust of these statutes is to limit
the application of joint and several liability in some or substantially all tort
cases. The practical consequence of this legislation is to place the risk of
tortfeasor insolvency on the plaintiff instead of other tortfeasors.
A few states have effectively abolished joint and several liability for most
tort claims, with limited exceptions.4" The more common pattern of reform
of defect); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law Co-op. 1994) (claim must be filed within three years of
discovery of defect).
34. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-106 (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A-097
(1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 96 (West 1988).
35. All fifty states have enacted statutes of repose dealing with one or more of the above categories
of cases, although some statutes have been found to violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection
or access to the courts. See, e.g., Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 435 N.W.2d 244 (Wis. 1989)
(real property improvement statute of repose violates equal protection clause of state and federal
constitution); Hanson v. Williams Co., 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986) (products liability statute of
repose violated equal protection by denying plaintiff class access to the courts).
36. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102.5 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. Ch. 95.11 (1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1993).
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-11 (Michie 1982
& Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (1983).
38. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1994) (held to violate equal protection of the Alaska
Constitution in 752 P.2d 476); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260,
§ 2b (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); WYO. SAT. §§ 1-
3-111 (1988).
39. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 110 (1996) (joint liability abolished with respect to
noneconomic damages in product liability actions, while several liability is limited to fair share of
noneconomic damages).
40. For a summary of state laws on joint and several liability, see Jean M. Eggen, Understanding
State Contribution Laws and Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701,
1751-77 (1995).
41. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-258a(d) (1985 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109
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legislation significantly modifies, but does not abolish, the doctrine. The types
of modifications vary considerably. Perhaps the most common reform limits the
application of joint and several liability to defendants whose culpability exceeds
some specified threshold.42 Other states abolish joint and several liability only
when the plaintiff is partially at fault,43 or only for particular types of
damages," or place some limit on the total amount of damages for which a
defendant may be held jointly and severally liable.45 A few statutes authorize
the reallocation of uncollectible shares among all of the responsible parties,
including the plaintiff if she was negligent.'
c. Punitive Damages Reform The Product Liability Legal Reform Act
imposes procedural reforms and caps on punitive damages.47 The procedural
reforms include a "conscious, flagrant, indifference" to the safety of others
standard of culpability, a clear and convincing evidence standard for the burden
of proof, and the use of bifurcated trials.48 The Act caps punitive damage
liability at the greater of two times compensatory damages or $250,000.19
Several states already have enacted punitive damage reform legislation.
State punitive damage reform legislation often imposes caps expressed in terms
(1988).
42. See, e.g., MONT. CODEANN. § 27-1-703 (1991) (stating thatdefendantmustbemore than 50%
at fault for joint and several liability); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 (1994) (requiring that a medical
malpractice defendant must be 25% at fault to be subject for joint liability); cf. Act Effective Sept. 1,
1995, ch. 19 (S.B. 25) 1995, TEX. SEss. LAW SERV. 108 (Vernon) (eliminating joint liability for
defendant less than 51% at fault); Act of May 18, 1995, ch. 136, 1995 TEx. SEss. LAW SERV. 971
(Vernon).
43. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Supp. 1995) (stating that there is no joint liability for
damages where plaintiffat fault); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1996) (establishing several liability where
plaintiff at fault except for strict liability, intentional tort, hazardous waste, concerted act); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 42-3A-1 (Michie 1989) (establishing several liability where comparative negligence applies,
unless intentional tort, vicarious liability, strict liability).
44. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1995) (abolishing joint liability for
noneconomic loss, but retaining it for economic loss); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin
1993) (establishing several liability for non-economic damages where the plaintiff at fault).
45. See, e.g., LA. Cr1. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West Supp. 1996) (establishing joint liability only
for 50% of plaintiff's recoverable damages); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (Supplement 1995) (requiring
joint liability only for 50% of plaintiff's recoverable damages for non-intentional tort); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-15 (1984 & Supp. 1996) (establishing that defendant less than 50% at fault not
liable for more than twice his fault).
46. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) (reallocating
damages among all responsible "parties"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996)
(establishing that defendant less than 35% at fault not liable for more than twice his fault); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 537.067 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996); cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 1991
& Supp. 1995) (stating that original negligence calculation and reallocation does not include claimant).
47. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 108 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Id. The Act limits punitive damages to the lesser of two times compensatory damages or
$250,000. The Act also authorizes the trial judge to award punitive damages in excess of the cap cases
of egregious conduct.
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of a fixed ceiling,5" a multiple of compensatory damages, or both.5' Many
states impose the type of procedural protections for defendants found in the
proposed federal legislation.52 Indeed, some states provide defendants with
additional protections, such as prohibiting multiple punitive damage awards in
products liability cases 53 and giving the state a percentage of punitive damage
awards. 54
d. Substantive Products Liability Doctrine The Product Liability Legal
Reform Act contains several provisions addressing substantive products liability
doctrine. The Act restricts the application of strict liability against many retail
sellers55 and creates defenses based on misuse, alteration and user intoxica-
tion.
51
Once again, state legislatures have been active in these and other aspects
of products liability doctrine. The thrust of virtually all state statutes is to
afford greater protection to product liability defendants than existed before their
enactment. More than a dozen states have passed legislation insulating retailers
from strict liability in most cases.57 The general approach of this legislation
is to preclude the application of strict liability (except for express warranty)
50. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1995) ($250,000 in cases other than
products liability); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992).
51. See, e.g., Act of March 9, 1995, Pub. L. 89-7 (H.B. 20), 1995 111. Legis. Serv. 233 (West);
Act of April 26, 1995, Pub. L. 278-1995 (H.B. 1741), 1995 Ind. Legis. Serv. 391 (West); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 42.005 (1992); Act of May 25, 1995, Ch. 287 (S.B. 263), 1995 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1337
(West); Act of April, 1995, Ch. 19, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 108 and 971 (Vernon); Act of May 18,
1995, Ch. 136, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 971 (Vernon).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE
§ 668A.1 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184 (Michie
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 549.191 & 549.200 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-221 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 41.315 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-1-4 to 4.1 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
18-1 (1992).
53. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (Supp. 1995) (allowing only a single punitive
damage award in products liability claims arising out of the same conduct); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 510.263(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (allowing the defendant to request a credit against a punitive damage
award for prior awards arising from the same conduct).
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1995); IOWA
CODE § 668A.1 (1991).
55. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1996) provides that product sellers, rental and leasing
companies are liable only for negligence, breach of warranty, or intentional wrongdoing (unless the
manufacturer is not subject to court's jurisdiction or is otherwise judgment proof).
56. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(1996) provides an absolute defense if the product user
was under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs and that condition was more than 50% percent
responsible for the user's injuries. Section 105 of the Act provides that misuse or alteration of a product
by any person reduces the user's recovery by the percentage of harm attributable to that conduct, though
the defense does not apply to misuse or alteration by the claimant's employer.
57. For citations to specific statutes, see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, PRODUCTS
LIABIUTY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 172-73 (2d ed. 1992). See generally Frank Cavico, Jr., The Strict
Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213
(1987).
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against a retailer unless the manufacturer cannot be identified, is insolvent, or
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 8 Such statutes sometimes
include a "sealed container" defense which protects the retailer and other non-
manufacturing sellers who buy and resell a product in a sealed container with
no reason to believe it is defective.59
Many states also have enacted legislation addressing such substantive
products liability issues as product misuse or alteration, state of the art, and
compliance with government regulations. One group of statutes treats evidence
that a product design or warning complies with the "state of the art" as an
affirmative defense6 or a rebuttable presumption that the product is not
defective.61 Misuse or substantial alteration of a product will preclude or
reduce liability in many states.62 Compliance with applicable government
regulations creates a statutory rebuttable presumption that a product is not
defective in some states, 63 and bars recovery in others.'
A few states have enacted statutes under which the passage of time affects
substantive products liability doctrine or creates a defense to an otherwise valid
claim. In Kentucky, for example, it is presumed that a product is not defective
if the injury occurs more than five years from the sale to the first customer or
eight years after manufacture. 6 Other states recognize a "useful life" defense
barring recovery when the injury occurs following the expiration of the
ordinary useful life of the product.' These statutes often specify the presumed
useful life of various categories of products.67
Of course, not every state has enacted each of these reforms and there are
significant variations in legislative patterns among the states. However, the
volume and direction of state tort reform legislation casts serious doubts on the
assumption that state legislators have succumbed to a race to the bottom in
58. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-402 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1980).
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
311 (1989).
60. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4 (Bums
1992).
61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403 (West 1989); KY. REV. SAT. ANN. § 411.310
(Michie 1992).
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403
(West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-1405 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4 (Burns 1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin, 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-179 (1995).
63. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (1992). Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600-2946 (West 1986)
(compliance with government laws and regulations admissible as evidence).
64. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050 (West
1992).
65. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Michie 1992).
66. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1985 & Supp. 1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 1988).
67. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (1990) (ten years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1985 and
Supp. 1995) (ten years).
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personal injury litigation. These statutes clearly inure to the benefit of tort
defendants in general and products liability defendants in particular. Far from
evidencing a systematic bias against nonresident defendants, the pattern of state
legislation reveals a pronounced willingness to compromise the interests of
resident tort plaintiffs.
2. Judicial Opinions
The race to the bottom thesis also postulates that judges will be unduly
predisposed to favor the interests of resident plaintiffs in the development and
application of tort doctrine. Again, one would expect the race to the bottom to
be most evident in products liability cases because most of the defendants are
nonresidents and most of the plaintiffs are residents of the forum state.
However, there is substantial evidence that over the past decade judges have
not systematically favored plaintiffs in products liability cases. On the contrary,
since the early 1980s, judicial decisions at both the trial and appellate levels
have tended to favor defendants.
Professors Henderson and Eisenberg documented this trend in a highly
publicized article analyzing more than 3000 products liability opinions
published between 1976 and 1988.68 They describe a "quiet revolution" in
which courts during the 1980s made "a significant turn in the direction of
judicial decision making away from extending the boundaries of products
liability and toward placing significant limitations on plaintiffs' rights to
recover in tort for product-related injuries." 69 Henderson and Eisenberg's data
base included published opinions from state and federal appellate courts and
federal district courts.
Looking first at appellate decisions, Henderson and Eisenberg found that
between 1983 and 1988 there were statistically significant increases in the
percentage of published opinions favoring defendants, 70 the percentage of
cases in which defendants prevailed as a matter of law,71 and the percentage
of "groundbreaking" opinions favoring defendants. 72 At the district court
level, Henderson and Eisenberg found statistically significant declines in
68. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
69. Id. at 480.
70. Between 1976 and 1983 the defendant benefitted from slightly more than half the reported
decisions (51.2%). Between 1983 and 1988 the percentage of decisions benefitting defendants steadily
increased, reaching 63.4% in 1988. Id. at 504.
71. Defendants prevailed as a matter of law in 13.9% of the reported opinions in 1983. The
corresponding figure for 1988 was 26.7%. Id. at 509.
72. A decision was characterized as "groundbreaking" based on Professor Henderson's assessment
of whether and to what extent it changed the law. Id. at 511 n.138. In 1983, 2.5% of published opinions
broke new ground by ruling for the defendant and 5.8 % broke new ground by ruling for the plaintiffs.
By 1988, 7.9% of the published opinions broke new ground for the defendants while 7.4% did so for
the plaintiffs. Id. at 512.
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plaintiffs success rates73 and "expected returns"74 in products liability cases,
and an increase in the percentage of cases in which the defendant prevailed on
pretrial motion.75
Interestingly, the pro-defendant shift in judicial opinions is evident before
the wave of tort reform legislation of the mid-1980s.76 Thus, judges were not
simply responding to legislative initiatives. In a subsequent article, Eisenberg
and Henderson augment their earlier work with new data and additional
analysis. 7 In this article, they make clear that "the 1980s pro-defendant
movement is not the result of sharp reversals in a few jurisdictions; rather it
is truly national, with most states showing defendant success rate increases in
the second half of the 1980s."
78
Professor Gary Schwartz offers another important assessment of judicial
trends in tort.79 Professor Schwartz did not find a "revolution," but concluded
that the early 1980's marked a "possible end" of an era of judicial expansion
of tort liability rules. By this he meant that "courts have rejected invitations to
endorse new innovations in liability; moreover, they have placed a somewhat
conservative gloss on innovations undertaken in previous years." o
A large number of the cases cited by Schwartz in support of his conclusion
come from the field of products liability-the area of tort law in which
proponents of the race to the bottom thesis predict judges are most likely to
favor plaintiffs. He discussed various opinions in which courts refused to apply
strict liability principles for claims involving natural impurities in food, the sale
of defective prescription drugs by pharmacies, successor corporate liability,
warnings and general product design. He also observed that courts have
generally rejected the theory of generic risk-benefit liability for inherently
dangerous products like hand guns, cigarettes, trail bikes, and convertible
automobiles, and that several state courts have ruled that manufacturers of DES
73. Plaintiffs prevailed in 40.5% of the product liability cases showing definite judgments in 1979.
By 1987, the plaintiffs' success rate had declined to 32.5%. Most of this decline occurred in 1983 and
after. Id. at 523.
74. The expected recovery is a product of the success rate for each year times the median and mean
plaintiffs recoveries for the same year. Id. at 527. Henderson and Eisenberg compared the expected
returns in product liability cases with those in other types of cases. In 1982, "the ratio of expected
returns in products and other tort litigation peaked at 3.23. That is, taking into account the likelihood
of winning and the size of the award in cases that allowed awards, products plaintiffs could expect to
recover slightly more than three times as much as other tort plaintiffs. By 1987 this ratio had dropped
by one-half, to 1.65." Id. at 528-29.
75. Product liability defendants prevailed at the pretrial motion stage in 4.4% of the 1979 cases in
which issue had been joined. By 1987 this rate had increased to 5.5%. Id. at 531.
76. Id. at 480-81.
77. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quite Revolution in Products
Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992).
78. Id. at 734.
79. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
80. Id. at 603 (footnote omitted).
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owed "no duty" to the second generation plaintiffs injured by the drug.8
Of course, Henderson, Eisenberg and Schwartz were not addressing the
question of whether state judges have built-in incentives to favor the interests
of resident plaintiffs over those of nonresident defendants. Yet, their studies
suggest that such forces, if they exist, have had little effect in practice in the
past decade. If judges were engaged in a race to the bottom as suggested by
Justice Neely, one would not expect to find the pattern of pro-defendant
judicial opinions described by Henderson and Eisenberg and cautiously
confirmed by Schwartz.'
C. The Conclusion: An Assumption Found Wnting
There is little evidence that states are incompetent to formulate tort policy
because they are competing with each other for judgments against nonresident
defendants. The assumed biases and structural incentives, if they exist, do not
appear to have substantially influenced policy output in the last ten years. The
statutes and court opinions summarized above reflect the fact that states do
have the capacity to consider and value the interests of nonresident tort
defendants. Indeed, for the past decade, defendants have fared remarkably well
in both judicial and legislative forums. If tort policy is to be formulated at the
national level, other justifications are needed. 3
II. Do STATES POSSESS SPECIAL COMPETENCY TO FORMULATE ToR
POLICY?
The analysis of state statutory reforms and judicial decisions provided in the
first half of this paper calls into question the assumption of state incompetence
underlying current proposals to create federal tort law. Specifically, the scores
of state statutes adopting reforms similar to those contained in the proposed
81. Id. at 653-61.
82. Judicial tempering of legal doctrine in a way that favors defendants continues. In Life Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 1995 Ala. LEXIS 435 (Ala. November 17, 1995), the Alabama Supreme Court established
new rules for punitive damages. Punitive damages may be awarded only in bifurcated trials and one-half
of the net award is to be given to the state.
83. For example, some proponents of federal tort reform emphasize the need for uniform rules.
See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, The Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1996). This justification for federal tort policy-making does not rest on the proposition that
states are structurally biased against nonresident defendants. Rather, it rests on the proposition that
uniformity itself is a virtue. For example, the complexity and variety of state contribution laws are said
to impede the efficient settlement of mass tort claims. Jean M. Eggen, Understanding State Contribution
Laws and Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701 (1995). Professor
Eggen proposes a federal rule to provide the uniformity necessary to facilitate settlement. Variation,
however, is touted as a virtue by those who see states as laboratories of experimentation. See, e.g.,
Perlman, supra note 5, at 507. Thus, the same characteristic-variation-is cited by both proponents
and critics of federal tort policy-making in support of their respective positions. Whether one thinks that
tort law should be formulated at the state or national level depends on how one assesses the costs and
benefits of uniformity measured against the costs and benefits of experimentation.
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federal legislation suggest that states have not been "racing to the bottom" by
expanding plaintiff opportunities for recovery, especially vis-a-vis out-of-state
defendants..
This analysis, however, does not necessarily shed light on the second and
contradictory assumption of special state competence. In particular, the
preceding scrutiny of selected state tort reforms does not address questions
related to the reasonableness or merit of the legislation. It is this assumption
of special state competence that directly relates to new federalism proposals and
that serves as the focus of this portion of the paper.
Whether or not state legislatures are more able than Congress to craft
public policy is an empirical question, albeit one involving personal judgment.
As such, it is an appropriate topic for more social scientific research methods.
Here, these methods are applied to one of the most controversial dimensions
of tort reform, legislative caps on damages, which has become a focal point in
contemporary political debates about federal tort law.
In the following pages, we provide a descriptive statistical profile of these
caps and systematically examine related differences against insurance
profitability. If state legislatures are particularly competent policy-makers, there
should be some correlation between insurance profitability and damage-cap
legislation. In the process of examining this association, we control for other,
potentially important correlates of public policy. These include the socio-
economic, political, and legal characteristics of the fifty states. The tests that
are presented here fall within an established line of inquiry in political science
and sociology. However, it is important to note that this kind of analysis is
more suggestive than conclusive. Questions of state legislative competence
invariably lead to judgments about legislative ability, motivation and
processes-conclusions that cannot be drawn from the aggregate state-level
research offered here. Nonetheless, a systematic study of damage-cap
legislation against a measure of insurance profitability and with controls for the
social-economic, political, and legal characteristics of the states provides a first
empirical step in analyzing the special state competence assumption.
This segment of the paper consists of five sections. First, we provide an
overview of this type of social scientific research. Second, we provide a
descriptive statistical profile of the legislative damage caps under scrutiny.
Third, we outline the research methodology for the multivariate analysis of
comparative state policy. Next we consider these results and offer some
speculation on the related patterns. Finally, we consider the implications of
both our legal and social scientific analyses for the issue of tort reform in
particular and new federalism in general.
A. Social Scientific Analysis of State Policy and Problems
Political scientists have directed considerable attention to differences in
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state legislation. Underlying this research is the assumption that states with
contrasting levels of population, education, per capita income, electoral
ideology, and political party relationships will have similarly contrasting public
policy. More generally, this research assumes that state policy outputs correlate
with the social, economic, and political characteristics of the states themselves.
This line of inquiry developed in the 1960s with the works of Thomas
Dye," Richard Hofferbert, s  Lewis Froman,86 and Ira Sharkansky.Y Its
development followed economic studies on the relationship between the level
of governmental expenditures and the socio-economic attributes of both states
and municipalities.88 Although some of these early efforts were criticized for
primitive conceptions of state political processes,89 the field of state compara-
tive policy analyses developed and is now an established line of inquiry. In the
process, political scientists have continued to examine state expenditures,
especially in social welfare (e.g., Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Medicaid) against the social, economic, and political dimensions of the states
themselves.' They have also examined state taxation, transportation,
education, and other public policies in similar fashion.9
Of more direct relevance to the research reported here are those compara-
tive state policy studies on selected dimensions of criminal and tort law. Here,
social scientists have examined differences in statutes, for example, those
regarding selected victimless crimes,' rape shield provisions,' and state
rape reform. 94 Political scientists have also directed attention to differences
in state judicial systems, such as differences in adoption of tort law innova-
tions. 5 Additionally, sociologists have examined state rape rates, police
84. THOMAS R. DYE, POLITCS, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC (1966).
85. Richard I. Hofferbert, The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and
Environmental Variables in the American States, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 73 (1966).
86. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics, 60 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 952 (1966).
87. Ira Sharkansky, EconomicDevelopment, Regionalism, and State Political Systems, 12 MIDWEST
J. POL. Sci. 41 (1968).
88. For earlier economic studies see, for example, Glen W. Fisher, Determinants of State andLocal
Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis, 14 NAT. TAX J. 349 (1961); Seymour Sacks &
Robert Harris, The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental
Flow of Funds, 17 NAT. TAx J. 75 (1964).
89. See, e.g., Herbert Jacob & Michael Lipsky, Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of
Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics, 30 J. POL. 510, 511-19 (1968).
90. See, e.g., Charles J. Barrileaux & Mark E. Miller, The Political Economy of State Medicaid
Policy, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1089 (1989); J.C. Garand, Partisan Change and Shifting Expenditure
Priorities in the American States, 1945-78, 13 AM. POL. Q. 355 (1985).
91. See, e.g., DAVID NICE, POLICY INNOVATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (1994).
92. See, e.g., David Nice, State Deregulation ofIntimate Behavior, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 203 (1988).
93. See, e.g., Jack E. Call et al., An Analysis of State Rape Shield Laws, 72 SOC. ScI. Q. 774
(1991).
94. See, e.g., Ronald J. Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. SOC.
REV. 329 (1988).
95. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns ofAdoption of TortLaw Innovations:
An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975 (1981).
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reports, and arrests. 96
In this study of comparative state policy, scholars have frequently debated
the competing power of economic versus political correlates. More recent
scholarship has tried to reconcile the "economics-politics" divide and suggests
that both types of correlates are important.' David Nice reviews these
developments and argues that the explanatory power of any type of policy
correlate depends on the subject matter under scrutiny.9"
In the comparative state policy analysis presented later in this paper, we
generally follow Nice's advice. Incorporating social, economic, and political
indicators, we also include factors particular to the tort reform debate and the
strength of the insurance industry. We explicitly include varied measures of the
insurance industry because the general tort reform debate has been framed, in
large part, as a function of an "insurance crisis" and because that industry has
much to gain or lose in legislative policies.
B. Descriptive Profile of Legislative Damage Caps
Prior to a multivariate analysis of comparative state policy, it is useful to
construct a descriptive, statistical profile of the policy of interest. Coding state
damage-cap legislation is complicated. Although the relevant statutes have
patterns in common, variations among them make it difficult to devise one
variable. The final quantitative coding scheme consisted of twenty dimensions
ranging from the existence of caps on punitive damages to the repeal of
damage-cap legislation.
Table 1 provides a descriptive statistical summary of the damage-cap
legislation that was considered in the first part of this paper. The summary
results provided here indicate that state legislatures have enacted a variety of
damage caps. First, twenty-two states have adopted legislation to restrict
punitive damages. This legislation encompasses a variety of caps on punitive
damages: caps with exceptions, caps without exceptions, caps restricted to
specific areas, and one rather sweeping disallowance of punitives altogether.
Of the twenty-two states with a punitive damage cap, some restrict the cap to
certain areas, with medical malpractice the most common. Six states provide
a fixed ceiling, five a compensatory multiple, and two a combination. The
remainder simply disallow punitives in particular areas with no cap specified.
In addition, some punitive damage legislation has requirements for
96. See, e.g., LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY: A STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS (1989); Ronald J. Berger et al., The Impact of Rape Law Reform:
An Aggregate Analysis of Police Reports and Arrests, 19 CRIM. JUST. REV. 1 (1994).
97. See, e.g., P.E. Peterson & M. Rom, American Federalism, Weyfare Policy and Presidential
Choices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1989); Robert D. Plotnick & Richard F. Winters, A Politico-
economic Theory of Income Redistribution, 79 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 458 (1985).
98. NICE, supra note 91, at 37.
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bifurcated procedures and for payment to the state of a proportion of the
award. As specified in Table 1, five states have adopted bifurcated proceedings
for tort trials where punitives are sought. A slightly larger number of states
(seven) have statutory provisions that authorize a claim by the state to a
proportion of punitive awards. These provisions range from 33 % to 75 % with
50% the most common.
Thirty-five states have enacted legislation imposing caps on compensatory
damages. These statutory provisions vary considerably. There are, for
example, many statutes that place limits on compensatory damages in particular
types of cases. Twelve states have caps on compensatory damages in medical
malpractice, three apply to all types of tort claims, and the twenty remaining
include varied restrictions related to compensatory damages in diverse and
special circumstances (e.g. professional malpractice other than medical and
auto claims when driver and passengers were not wearing seat belts).
State statutory provisions related to compensatory damages also vary in
terms of the element of compensatory damage subject to the cap. Of the thirty-
five states that limit compensatory damages, eleven apply the cap only against
non-economic damages while twenty-four do not. Three states cap only
economic compensatory damages, while twenty-one limit recovery for some
combination of economic and non-economic damages.
As summarized in Table 1, state legislative restrictions and caps on both
punitive and compensatory damages are both extensive and varied. Neverthe-
less, several states have not taken any legislative action in either area. This
distinction and other statutory differences are potential subjects for the
statistical tests that are outlined next.
C. Methodology for Multivariate Analysis
The first step in this stage of the research consisted of the specification of
the dependent variable(s). Since it was impractical to use all of the twenty
dimensions of statutory damage caps discussed previously, we initially applied
two statistical approaches to help reduce the twenty dimensions for multivariate
tests of comparative state policies. The first such test consisted of factor
analysis where we examined whether subsets of the twenty dimensions are
highly related. If this were the case, a small set of factors could then be used
as dependent variables in statistical tests. Factor analysis of the twenty
dimensions was inconclusive, however. 9
Our second statistical effort to reduce the number of dependent variables
consisted of the construction of an additive index. This index was a composite
99. This was not surprising as some of the twenty dimensions were quite skewed with very limited
numbers of states in given categories. Results of this factor analysis are available on file with the
authors.
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of seven dimensions of legislative damage caps. These consisted of damage
caps on punitives, punitive cap restrictions, fixed ceilings on punitive caps,
bifurcated procedures for punitive caps, caps on compensatory damages,
compensatory cap restriction, and compensatory caps inclusive of both
economic and non-economic injury. The index was constructed as follows: a
state was given a point if it had some kind of punitive damage cap, a point if
that cap was not restricted to any area or type of action, a point if there was
a fixed ceiling, a point if it had a bifurcated procedure, a point if it had a some
kind of cap on compensatory damages, a point if that cap was not restricted to
any area or type of action, and a point if the compensatory cap applied to both
economic and non-economic injury. Possible scores on this index ranged from
zero to seven. Although this index provided a logical summary measure of
some of the most consequential of the twenty dimensions of statutory damage
caps, it did not yield significant results in multivariate testing. 100
In the face of the failures of these efforts to specify the dependent
variable(s) for multivariate analysis, we decided to focus on two of the most
general dimensions: caps on punitive damages and caps on compensatory
damages. Methodological as well as practical reasons dictated this choice. The
first of the two dependent variables, whether states had adopted some kind of
limit on punitive damages or not, exhibited sufficient variation (22 with limits,
28 without) for multivariate analysis. A similar pattern held for the second
variable as 15 states had no cap on compensatory damages and 33 had enacted
some kind of limit in this area.
Can we explain any of the basic differences in state adoption of punitive
and compensatory caps by using the comparative state policy analysis
approach? Are differences in statutory damage caps (punitive and compensato-
ry) correlated with any state attributes? Of primary importance here is the
potential correlation between legislative damage caps and insurance company
profitability. If states are particularly competent in policy-making, then we
would expect some correlation between statutory damage caps and insurance
company profitability. We cannot, though, consider that correlation without
controlling for socio-economic, political, and legal attributes. These potential
correlates of state public policy were discussed in the earlier summary of the
state comparative policy analysis literature and are outlined in Appendix A.
For socio-economic or demographic variables, we obtained data on four
possible indicators: per capita income, degree of urbanization, racial
composition, and level of education."' We hypothesize (1) that states with
100. Specifically, the additive index "washed out" in ordinary least squares regression. This
indicates that variation in the index could not be accounted for by the independent variables in our data
set. Related results are not reported here but are available on file with the authors.
101. For Information on these and all potential independent variables in the data set, see Appendix
B.
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higher per capita income would be more inclined to have damage caps, (2) that
the more urbanized the state, the more likely the legislature would have enacted
damage caps, and (3) that the higher the proportion of African-Americans the
less likely the legislature would have enacted damage caps. In these proposi-
tions, we assumed that more wealthy states would be more inclined to support
corporate and industrial interests; that more urbanized states would be more
likely to have the exceptional, "large verdict" tort cases and, as a consequence,
support statutory limits on juries; and that states with larger proportions of
African-Americans would be less likely to support legislation that has
frequently been characterized as more reflective of corporate than individual
interests.
Hypotheses about the relationship between level of education and damage-
cap statutes are not as clear and, in fact, we posit two, contradictory
propositions. Higher levels of education could suggest that a more sophisticated
citizenry would be more aware of the complex character of the tort reform
debate and less supportive of simplistic, legislative approaches. In turn, the
legislature would be less likely to enact statutory damage caps. Alternatively,
higher levels of education could suggest a higher standard of living that might
correlate with the more corporate interests reflected in tort reform.
The second category of potential correlates of damage-cap legislation
consists of insurance industry attributes. The variables in this category include
a measure of insurance profitability, 10 the strength of insurance industry
lobbyists, the proportion of insurance agents in the state legislature, and the
selection of the insurance commissioner. Propositions about these attributes and
damage-cap legislation are fairly obvious. We hypothesize that states with
higher loss ratios in 1986, with stronger insurance lobbyists, and with higher
proportions of insurance agents in the legislature would be more likely to have
statutory damage caps. We used adjusted loss ratio data from 1986 because the
bulk of state tort reform legislation was enacted in 1986-87. The specific
relationship between the selection method of the insurance commissioner was
less obvious and we posited both direct and inverse correlations.
The third group of potential correlates of damage-cap legislation consists
of the state legal environment. These include the proportion of attorneys in the
legislature, the nature of the judicial selection system, and the partisan nature
of the same system. The proportion of attorneys in the state legislature is
parallel to the proportion related to insurance agents. In contrast to the latter,
however, we hypothesized two, conflicting relationships. The proportion of
attorneys in the legislature could signal support for plaintiff trial lawyers and
102. Insurance profitability is operationally defined as the ratio of direct losses to premiums earned,
a measure recommended by the American Insurance Association's research division and regularly used
in insurance-related research. For data from 1986, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER, NIAC REPORT ON PROFITABnILITY BY LINE AND BY STATE (1987).
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inversely correlate with tort reform. Or, it could signal an orientation in favor
of the defense bar that would yield a positive correlation. Propositions about
the relationship between damage-cap legislation and the character of the state's
judicial selection system were more straight-forward. We hypothesize that
states with electoral and partisan systems would be more likely to have enacted
statutory damage caps as legislatures may be more skeptical about a judiciary
that is so obviously political.
The final set of potential independent variables consists of state political
indicators. Here we include electoral conservatism, state policy innovation, and
legislative partisanship. We hypothesize that the more conservative the
electorate, the more likely the state legislature would be to enact damage caps.
A similar proposition holds for legislative partisanship as we anticipate that the
greater the proportion of Democrats, the less likely the enactment of damage
caps. These two hypotheses reflect popular conceptions of tort reform as both
conservative and Republican agenda items. The variable on state policy
innovation lends itself to more complex research propositions. Since the
measure we use consists of an index of plaintiff-oriented doctrinal innovations
in tort law, one could hypothesize that the more innovative states would be less
likely to enact damage caps. However, if the innovation in question is less
representative of ideology and more reflective of legislative willingness to
adjust tort doctrine, it could have an inverse relationship.
In any aggregate, statistical analysis of state policy outputs, the sample size
is small. Although we have the universe of states, the fact that there are only
fifty limits the number of independent variables that can be tested in multivar-
iate analyses. In this stage of the research, then, we had to select a smaller set
of independent variables. To reduce the set of fourteen, potential independent
variables, we first examined the bivariate relationships between each of the
twenty dimensions of legislative damage caps and each of the potential
independent variables. The resulting correlations indicated that two variables
could be eliminated at this stage, i.e., two indicators did not correlate
significantly with any of the twenty dimensions of damage-cap legislation.
Table 2 provides a list of those independent variables that significantly
correlated with individual dimensions in the full set of twenty damage-cap
provisions. In order to reduce the set of independent variables further and also
to guard against multicollinearity,0 3 we examined the correlations among the
103. Multicollinearity refers to the problem of inter-item correlation. When independent or
predictor variables are highly correlated with each other, their separate effects cannot be distinguished
and the resulting statistics are unstable. Prior to multivariate analysis, then, inter-item correlations have
to be examined and variables that are highly correlated reduced or eliminated. In this research we used
a coefficient standard of .6 although .7 is a frequently cited norm. See, e.g., BRUCE D. BOWEN &
HERBERT F. WEISBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA ANALYSIS 160 (1980).
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remaining twelve variables.1"4 At this stage, we were able to eliminate four
other variables, leaving us with a set of eight. Eight independent variables,
however, is still unwieldy for multivariate analysis, so we referred to both the
comparative state policy literature and the current tort reform debate to direct
the selection of the final set. This set included one socio-demographic indicator
(per capita income), a measure of insurance profitability (adjusted loss ratio),
a dimension of the insurance industry's political strength (strength of insurance
industry lobby), one dimension of the legal environment (proportion of
attorneys in the state legislature), and two political attributes (proportion of
Democrats in state legislature and tort policy innovation).
D. Results
We focused on two dependent variables in the multivariate analysis of
comparative state tort reform policy. More specifically, we hypothesize that
states with higher insurance industry losses, stronger insurance lobbies, higher
per capita income, and fewer Democrats in the legislature would be more likely
to have statutory caps on punitive and compensatory damages. Regarding
patterns of tort policy innovation and the proportion of attorneys in the
legislature, we expect that the correlation could be either direct or inverse.
Of particular interest in this multivariate test is the variable that relates to
insurance profitability (1986 adjusted loss ratio). If state legislatures are closer
to problems in their respective jurisdictions and if this proximity carries some
kind of rational sensitivity, then we would expect that states with greater
insurance industry losses would be more likely to have enacted some kind of
statutory cap on punitive and compensatory damages. This, then, is the focal
point of our initial effort to test the special state competence hypothesis. The
other five variables in the model are basically included as controls.
Multivariate models were used to examine the correlation between the
dependent variables of interest (statutory caps on punitive and compensatory
damages) and the final set of six independent variables. Because the dependent
variable in both instances is binary, logit analysis is especially appropriate. 5
This particular statistical model is designed to test the predictive or correlative
powers of the independent variables, and in particular to identify the degree to
which those factors help to distinguish the states beyond what we could
anticipate by chance. The results of ihis logit model are set out in Table 3 for
104. These and the full set of inter-item correlation coefficients are on file with the authors.
105. Logit is a multivariate statistical model that is appropriately used with nominal or categorical
dependent variables. In contrast to linear regression where the dependent variable represents the
probability of an event happening, in logit the dependent variable is the log of the odds ratio of that
event happening. This dependent variable is not the odds ratio itself but the natural log of the odds ratio.
For a succinct overview of logit, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPATH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATrrruDINAL MODEL, app. at 364-72 (1993).
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punitive caps and in Table 4 for the compensatory variety. Logit results are
discussed in greater detail in Appendix B. 1"
With specific attention to the analysis of caps on punitive damages, only
two of the six independent variables were statistically significant at standard
levels (p = .05 or less). These consist of the strength of the insurance industry
lobby and the proportion of attorneys in the legislature. A third variable, the
Democratic proportion of the state legislative, approaches statistical signifi-
cance but does not quite meet the conventional standard. The remaining three
variables did not even begin to approach statistical significance, indicating that
they do not correlate with the statutory difference in question.
Of particular interest in the logit analyses of both punitive and compensato-
ry damage caps is the fact that insurance company profitability did not emerge
as a statistically significant correlate. This is interesting as one would expect
such a correlation if state legislatures were particularly competent. As
explained earlier, legislative competence is frequently described as sensitivity
to local problems. The profitability of the state's insurance industry, then,
could be construed as an indicator of a problem of critical relevance in the
debate about damage caps. The fact that this measure of insurance profitability
did not correlate with related statutory provisions does not automatically
indicate that state legislatures are incompetent. But it does call that assumption
into question and reinforces the need for more in-depth, empirical examina-
tions.
Mutivariate analysis of the basic statutory difference in state compensatory
caps were strikingly inconclusive. As table 4 indicates no variable emerged as
a significant correlate. This means that we were unable to account for the
difference between those states that had adopted some kind of compensatory
cap and those that had not. In the next section, we will consider what the
preceding multivariate results might indicate.
E. Discussion of Implications
Where does this preliminary test of state competence lead us? First, it
clearly suggests that insurance company profitability bears no relationship to
legislative damage caps. Although there are limits to this kind of analysis, it
is both interesting and provocative that no correlation emerged between this
"measure of the problem" and the enactment of statutory caps on both punitive
and compensatory damages. Although it is important to recognize that the
multivariate models need to be refined, the results here suggest that other
106. Logit analysis was run with two different statistical software programs, namely SPSS and
Microcrunch. The results were parallel especially vis-a-vis patterns of statistical significance. As
indicated in Table 3, SPSS program results were reported. Those obtained via Microcrunch are on file
with the authors.
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factors drive the tort reform process.
The correlates of punitive damage caps that emerged in this research call
to mind Stewart Macaulay's description of the two, most common reactions of
lawyers to social scientific evidence: "I already knew that" and "That is not
true.""' The correlation between the insurance industry lobby and damage
caps makes intuitive sense and clearly deserves the "I already knew that"
rejoinder. Anyone with exposure to American politics at any level of
government appreciates the fact that interest groups often help to shape, if not
define, legislation. The same can be said about the negative correlation between
the proportion of Democrats in the legislature and statutory damage caps. Both
common and political sense suggests that tort reform is more of a Republican
than a Democratic agenda item. Consequently, there is little surprise when we
find that the greater the proportion of Democrats in the legislative, the less
likely the state has enacted legislative damage caps.
But what do we make of the positive correlation between the proportion of
attorneys in the legislature and punitive damage caps? Although one might be
initially inclined to repeat Macaulay's "That is not true" rejoinder, there are
ways in which this association makes sense. Tort reform has been very
popular, perhaps resulting from popular misconceptions about the civil justice
system.108
Attorneys in the legislature are likely to be highly sensitive to legal issues
and thus more willing to support reforms that address public concerns about
tort law. The number of attorneys in the legislature, then, may simply reflect
a propensity to appeal to public sentiment while also trying to limit reforms in
something akin to "damage control".
When considering the influence of the plaintiff or defense bar on
legislators, however, the correlation between the proportion of attorneys in the
legislature and state differences in punitive damage caps is not as clear. Some
attorney legislators may be aligned with the plaintiff's trial bar. In this case,
both their personal and their clients' interests would be opposed to damage
caps. Other attorney legislators may be aligned with insurance and corporate
interests. In this situation, their clients (insurance companies and businesses)
would clearly favor such legislation. The personal interests of the defense
attorney, however, may be more complicated. Damage-cap legislation might
hurt the insurance defense lawyer if it produces a reduction in the number of
cases filed. There are recent reports of efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to solicit
PAC contributions from attorneys who represent tort defendants to mount a
107. Macaulay offered this observation during a lecture at the University of Georgia School of Law
in the early 1980s.
108. See, e.g., Thomas Eaton & Susette Talarico, Personal Injury Litigation in Georgia, 20
VERniCr 27 (1995); David Neubauer & Stephen S. Meinhold, Too Quick to Sue? Public Perceptions
of the Litigation Explosion, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (1994).
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campaign against a pending California automobile no-fault proposition."° All
of this does not necessarily shed light on the specific correlation noted in this
research. But it does suggest that Macaulay's "That is not true" response may
not be accurate.
Our inability to account for differences in state compensatory caps is even
more difficult to interpret. One would think that limits on compensatory
damages would be as much a political goal as caps on punitive damages,
particularly since the latter are awarded so infrequently. However, our
statistical results may be a function of the fact that a sizeable proportion of
states (35) have enacted some kind of compensatory cap which may, in turn,
affect the statistical calculations.
However intriguing the aforementioned results, it is important to recognize
that the aggregate analyses provided in this paper are more suggestive than
conclusive. Better measures of the variables of interest (e.g., more particular
or "line" adjusted loss ratios) may yield different results. Nonetheless, the
results are provocative and indicate that systematic, social scientific testing of
special state competence and other empirical assumptions related to "new
federalism" is needed. Additional aggregate-level analyses and case studies may
be especially illuminating. Case studies may be particularly valuable as more
definitive assessments of special state competence require analysis of legislative
histories to determine whether statutory damage caps are rational responses to
local problems or instead simply "politics as usual". 1 °
Anecdotal evidence from one state, Georgia, demonstrates the potential
value of case studies. In a 1991 case,"' the plaintiff claimed that the state's
$250,000 cap on punitives damages in non-product liability claims was
unconstitutional because the amount was arbitrary. In support of his position,
the plaintiff filed an affidavit from the chief lobbyist of the state medical
association at the time this statute was adopted. As an organizer of the Georgia
Liability Crisis Coalition who worked closely with insurance industry
representatives, this lobbyist was involved in virtually all related legislative
activity.
In his affidavit, this lobbyist acknowledged that despite requests from
himself and key legislators, insurance industry representatives could provide
109. Smart Taylor, Jr., Lawyers Should Look Past Self-Interest in Tort Reform Debate, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 19, 1996, at Al.
110. Here, it is important to keep in mind that "politics as usual" is not necessarily "irrational".
Specifically, public choice and neo-institutional theoretical frameworks suggest that there is considerable
rationality in the political process. In the context of this research, legislators' efforts to respond to the
interests of lobbyists (and campaign contributors) can be construed as quite rational, especially in terms
of electoral self-interest. As used in this context, however, rational refers to understandable or
reasonable without necessarily any dimension of self-interest. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IwMERmEcr
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICy 53-97 (1994).
111. Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1991).
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no "hard evidence" that proposed caps on compensatory or punitive damages
would affect insurance rates. Rather, he was instructed to respond to
legislators' inquiries with the statement that "most insurance companies are
multi-faceted companies and it's awfully difficult for them to separate out one
segment of data and give the sort of evidence requested.""' According to
this lobbyist, the specific amount of the punitive damage cap ultimately enacted
($250,000) was selected simply because it had been used in California. There
was no empirical evidence that the cap "was an appropriate or necessary
ceiling insofar as affecting (insurance) rates was concerned.""'
The legislative profile that emerges from this affidavit does not lend
credence to claims of special competence at the state level. Rather, it suggests
that statutory provisions are haphazardly formulated and that legislators have
little empirical evidence to evaluate either the need for or the potential effect
of tort reforms. Also, it suggests that insurance industry representatives were
either unable or unwilling to respond to repeated requests for information, even
when the requests came from their chief lobbyist and key legislators.
Moreover, the profile that emerges from the affidavit also illustrates the
relationship between tort reform policy-making and the insurance industry
lobby that our aggregate analysis suggested. More systematic legislative
histories in Georgia and other states, however, are needed if we want to be
able to offer more conclusive and reliable assessments of state policy-making
competence.
CONCLUSION
We have found evidence from the past decade that casts doubts on the
assumption that states are incompetent to formulate tort policy, particularly in
the area of products liability. Since the early 1980's, both statutes and court
decisions have been decidedly pro-defendant, thus suggesting that states are not
engaged in a race to the bottom for tort judgments against nonresident
defendants. At the same time, however, we find little evidence that states are
particularly competent in the formulation of tort policy. If they were, we would
expect some correlation between local measures of the underlying problem
(1986 insurance company profitability) and policy output (damage-cap
legislation). We found no such correlation for either punitive or compensatory
damage caps. Instead, punitive damage-cap legislation is positively associated
with insurance industry strength and the proportion of lawyers in the
legislature, and negatively associated with the proportion of Democrats in the
legislature. This suggests that state lawmakers are responding more to the
112. Affidavit of Rusty Kidd at 4, Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1991), Civil Action No.
88-CV-5648-B (Super. Ct. White County, State of Georgia, June 29, 1990).
113. Id. at6.
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political demands of powerful interest groups than to objective assessments of
particular local problems.
These results do not speak to the need for or desirability of specific tort
reform statutes. Nor do they suggest that tort policy is better made at the state
or national level. The debate about federalism in the context of tort reform may
be more an exercise in political rhetoric than a principled discourse in the
proper allocation of power between state and federal governments." 4 Those
who believe that their substantive policy preferences will fare better in
Congress will invoke the rhetoric of the race to the bottom and the states'
incompetency to address a national problem. Those who believe that their
substantive policy preferences will fare better in the statehouses will invoke the
rhetoric of states as laboratories of experimentation and the need to have
localized solutions to local problems. Representative Barney Frank candidly
acknowledged as much during the hearings on the proposed 1995 federal tort
reform legislation:
This legislation ought to make it absolutely clear that the number of
people in Congress who conscientiously decide how to vote based on
their conception of whether or not things ought to be State or Federal
is less than six. In fact, almost all of us vote to have that level of
government decide the question where we are most likely to agree with
the outcome.1
15
114. Of course, we are not the first to suggest that the language of federalism masks substantive
policy preferences. See, e.g., Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal
Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 499 (1989) (writing that the procedural and jurisdictional rules of
federal courts promotes substantive ends); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators
and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA.
L. REV. 265, 265 (1990) ("Conservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever
deference to the states happens to serve their political needs at a particular moment. Yet both groups
are quick to wield the power of the supremacy clause, while citing vague platitudes about the need for
uniformity among the states, whenever a single national rule in a particular area furthers their political
interests."(footnote omitted)).
115. The Common Sense Legal ReformAct of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1995) (comments of Representative Barney Frank (D.
Mass.)).
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF STATUTORY CAPS ON DAMAGES
VARIABLE FREQUENCY/PERCENTAGE
DAMAGE CAP ON PUNITIVES
No 28 56.0
Yes w/ Exception 4 8.0
Yes w/out Exceptions 6 12.0
Punitive not Allowed at All 1 2.0
Punitives not Allowed in Spec. Areas 11 22.0
Total 50 100.0
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN TYPES
No 5 10.0
Medical Malpractice 4 8.0
Products Liability 2 4.0
All 1 2.0
Other 10 20.0
Not Applicable 28 56.0
Total 50 100.0
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, FIXED CEILING
No 16 32.0
Yes 6 12.0
Not Applicable 28 56.0
Total 50 100.0
IF FIXED CEILING, AMOUNT
Zero 44 88.0
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY/PERCENTAGE
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, MULTIPLE OF COMPENSATORY
No 17 34.0
Yes 5 10.0
Not Applicable 28 56.0
Total 50 100.0
IF MULTIPLE OF COMPENSATORY, SPECIFIC PROPORTION






IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, COMBINATION OF FIXED AND MULTIPLE
No 20 40.0
Yes 2 4.0
Not Applicable 28 56.0
Total 50 100.0
RAISE IN STANDARD OF PROOF FOR PUNITIVE AWARDS
No Standard Specified 34 68.0
Preponderance of Evidence 0 0.0
Clear and Convincing 15 30.0
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 1 2.0
Other 0 0.0
Total 50 100.0
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY/PERCENTAGE
STANDARD OF PROOF RESTRICrED TO CERTAIN TYPES OR AREAS
No 10 20.0
Medical Malpractice 0 0.0
Products Liability 0 0.0
All 3 6.0
Other 2 4.0
Not Applicable 35 70.0
Total 50 100.0








IF PORTION OF PUNITIVE TO STATE, PROPORTION






Constructing a New Federalism
VARIABLE FREQUENCY/PERCENTAGE
IF PoRToN OF PUNITIVE To STATE, REsTCrED To TYPES OR AREAs
Not Restricted 0 0.0
Medical Malpractice 1 2.0
Products Liability 1 2.0
All 3 6.0
Other 2 4.0




Yes w/ Exceptions 23 46.0
Yes w/out Exceptions 12 24.0
Total 50 100.0
IF CAP ON COMPENSATORY, RESTRICrED To TYPES
Not Restricted 3 6.0
Medical Malpractice 12 24.0
Products Liability 0 0.0
All 0 0.0
Other 20 40.0
Not Applicable 15 30.0
Total 50 100.0
IF CAP ON COMPENSATORY, DAMAGES LIMITED To NON-ECONOMIC
No 24 48.0
Yes 11 22.0
Not Applicable 15 30.0
Total 50 100.0
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY/PERCENTAGE
IF CAP ON COMPENSATORY, DAMAGES LIMITED ONLY To ECONOMIC
No 32 64.0
Yes 3 6.0
Not Applicable 15 30.0
Total 50 100.0
IF CAP ON COMPENSAIoRY, DAMAGES LIMITED To BOrH
No 14 28.0
Yes 21 42.0
Not Applicable 15 30.0
Total 50 100.0
ANY REPEAL ON DAMAGE-CAP LEGISLATION
No 38 76.0
Yes 3 6.0
Not Applicable 9 18.0
Total 50 100.0
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TABLE 2
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS*
DEPENDENT VARIABLE/ R-VALUE P-VALUE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DAMAGE CAP ON PUNITIVES
Electoral Sel. of Judges -. 31 (.026)
Insurance Ind. Strength .31 (.028)
% Democrat in State Leg. -.28 (.046)
% Metropolitan .34 (.015)
Per Capita Income .33 (.021)
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, RESTRICrED TO CERTAIN TYPES
Insurance Industry Strength -.31 (.031)
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, FIXED CEILING
Innovation Score -.28 (.048)
Insurance Industry Strength -.41 (.003)
% Metropolitan -.38 (.007)
Partisan Sel. of Judges .28 (.051)
Per Capita Income -.33 (.021)
IF FIXED CEILING, AMOUNT
Selection of Insur. Commiss. .31 (.028)
IF CAP ON PUNITIVES, MULTIPLE OF COMPENSATORY
Insurance Industry Strength -. 34 (.016)
% Metropolitan -. 32 (.021)
IF MULTIPLE OF COMPENSATORY, SPECIFIC PROPORTION
Insurance Industry Strength .30 (.032)
% Metropolitan .28 (.049)
IF MULTIPLE OF COMPENSATORY, COMBINATION
Insurance Industry Strength -.33 (.018)
% Metropolitan -.36 (.011)
Per Capita Income -.29 (.038)
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE/ R-VALUE P-VALUE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
RAISE IN STANDARD OF PROOF
% Democrat in State Leg. -.36 (.011)
% Black -.31 (.028)
CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
% Attorneys in State Leg. .31 (.031)
IF CAP ON COMPENSATORY, RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN TYPES
Selection of Insur. Commiss. -. 31 (.030)
Any Repeal of Damage-cap Leg.
Adjusted Loss Ratio .29 (.044)
* Only statistically significant (p < = .05) bivariate correlations are reported.
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TABLE 3
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF DAMAGE CAPS ON PUNITIVES*
VARIABLE MLE S.E. SIGNIFICANCE IMPACT
Adjusted Loss -0.050 0.060 .40 -
% Att. in Legis. 8.870 4.575 .05** .49
Innovation 4.270 3.151 .18 -
Ins. Ind. Strgth. 1.213 0.567 .03** .27
% Dem. in Legis. -4.261 2.513 .09* -.49
Per Cap. Inc. 1990 0.000 0.0001 .85 -
Constant 2.402 5.911 .69
Chi Square 15.084 (Model Sig. at .02)
Goodness of Fit 53.106
-2 Log Likelihood 53.509
% Modal Category 56%
% Of Caps Pred. Correctly 77.27%
% Reduct. in Error 48.34%
* Damage Caps for punitives coded as 0 (none) and 1 (some kind of cap on
punitives). N = 50; 22 states with caps, 28 states w/o caps. The model
correctly predicts 77.27% of the states who enacted caps, for a 48.34%
reduction in error. Significance based on two-tailed t-distributions; * = p
< .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01.
Data compiled by SPSS 6.1 Logistic Regression.
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TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGE CAPs*
VARIABLE MLE S.E. SIGNIFICANCE
Adjusted Loss -0.016 0.048 .73
% Aft. in Legis. 6.053 5.026 .23
Innovation -1.916 3.089 .54
Ins. Ind. Strgth. -0.503 0.509 .32
% Dem. in Legis. -1.819 2.318 .43
Per Cap. Inc. 1990 0.0001 0.0002 .45
Constant 1.137 5.305 .83
Chi Square 5.514 (Model Insignif. at .48)
Goodness of Fit 46.73
-2 Log Likelihood 55.57
% Pred. Correctly 68%
Compensatory Damage Caps coded as 0 (none) and 1 (some kind of cap on
compensatory damages). N = 50; 15 states without caps, 35 states with
some kind of cap. Model correctly predicts 91.43 % of the caps, but only
13.33% of the states without caps. Overall prediction rate is 68%.
Significance based on two-tailed t-distributions; * = p < . 10; ** = p <
.05; *** = p < .01.
Data compiled by SPSS 6.1 Logistic Regression.




1. per capita income (+)
" state mean, 1990 census data
" STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF US
2. urbanization (+)
* % metropolitan, 1990 census data
e STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF US
3. racial composition (-)
* % African-American, 1990 census data
o STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF US
4. level of education (+/-)
* % high school graduation, 1990 census data
* STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF US
INSURANCE INDUSTRY VARIABLES
5. adjusted loss ratio (+)
* ratio of direct losses to premiums earned, 1986
" NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS
6. insurance industry lobbyist strength (+)
" categorical measure (0,1,2)
" Compiled from data presented in SARAH MORESHOUSE, STATE POLITICS,
AND POLICY (1981); INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WEST
(Ronald L Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas eds., 1987); INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (1992); INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN
THE NORTHEASTERN STATES (1993); INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE
MIDWESTERN STATES (1993).
7. insurance agents in state legislature (+)
0 % of state legislature, 1986
e NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE LEGISLATORS
8. selection of insurance commissioner (+/-)
" categorical measure of method (0,1)
" NATIONAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
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LEGAL VARIABLES
9. attorneys in state legislature (+1-)
* % of state legislature, 1986
* NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE LEGISLATURES
10. judicial selection method (+)
* categorical measure of method (0,1)
" THE BOOKS OF THE STATES, 1984-85
11. partisan identification in judicial selection (+)
" categorical measure of partisanship identification (0,1)
" THE BOOKS OF THE STATES, 1984-85
POLITICAL VARIABLES
12. electoral conservatism (+)
• estimates of state public opinion derived from national polling data,
1980s
* ERICKSON, WRIGHT, MCIVER, 1993 (complete citation)
13. tort policy innovation (+/-)
• post WW2 index of plaintiff-oriented doctrinal innovations in tort law
(index of 23 measures) constructed by Bradley C. Canon and Lawrence
Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of
Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 975 (1981).
14. legislative partisanship (-)
* % Democratic in state legislature, 1985
* NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE LEGISLATURES
* The plus and/or minus sign indicates the direction of the hypothesized
relationship with legislative damage caps.
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APPENDIX B
COMMENTS ON TABLE 3
MLE
This refers to maximum likelihood estimates. These represent the
probability of impact but are difficult to interpret without the impact
measure of substantive significance (see below).
With specific attention to Table 3, the results indicate that two variables
(insurance industry strength and % attorneys in the legislature) are
significant at p < .05. One (% Democrat in legislature) is significant at p
< .10. The size of the MLE suggests that the higher a positive coefficient,
the higher the probability of state enacting damage caps. The reverse effect
holds for negative coefficients.
SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE (IMPACT)
The impact of specific variables is the probability of caps on damages when
that variable is present rather than absent. It is measured from an arbitrary
baseline (here .5). With specific attention to a particular variable, the
impact refers to the effect that variable has on the probability of damage
caps. For example, the proportion of attorneys in the legislature raises the
probability of a cap on damages by .49 or 49% for every percent increase
in that proportion.
THE MODEL
Chi square refers to the significance of the model itself. With six degrees
of freedom, it is quite significant in this instance at p < .02. The goodness
of fit is about 53% but the measure itself is not generally regarded as a
stable overall indicator (equivalent, say, to the adjusted r square in ordinary
least squares regression). The model's predictive accuracy, however, is
easier to understand and more stable. In this instance, it is respectable at
77.27% which refers to our ability to explain or predict states with caps.
The percentage reduction in error (or a comparison of the error rate of the
model with that of predicting the modal value every time (i.e. by chance)
is 48.34%.
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